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THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN MARYLAND:
A PLAINTIFF'S DILEMMA
Marvin Ellint
The locality rule in medical malpractice cases has evolved into
varied hybrid forms throughout the United States. While the
majority of the states has adopted more liberal versions of the
rule, Maryland has stood fast in its application of a strict
locality rule. The author discusses the history and rationale of
the rule in Maryland, contrasts it with the prevailing national
trend and propounds reasons for the strict locality rule's abandonment. The subsequent article takes an opposing viewpoint.

It has been argued that a medical malpractice suit should be based on
the contractual relationship existing between a physician and his patient. However, Maryland rejects such a theory and grounds medical
malpractice litigation in tort.' The plaintiff must prove that the defendant-physician's conduct failed to meet the particular standard of care
and skill that the jurisdiction in question requires of all physicians and
surgeons engaged in the same type of practice as the defendant.2 To
establish the standard and breach, if any, the plaintiff must of necessity
use a medical expert who possesses the same special knowledge and skill
as the defendant. 3 Thus, a suit brought against a surgeon alleging
negligence must result in the plaintiff producing the testimony of an
expert in surgery who can state that the injury of which the plaintiff
complains resulted from the defendant-surgeon's failure to exercise the
usual standards of care in the performance of the surgery in question.
The various jurisdictions have used different rules in medical malt LL.B., 1953, University of Baltimore; Partner, Baker and Ellin, Baltimore, Md.
1. Benson v. Mays, 245 Md. 632, 221 A.2d 220 (1967). The court noted:
While it may be as appellant argues that a physician impliedly contracts with
those who employ him that he possesses and will exercise a reasonable degree of
care, skill and learning, . . . malpractice is predicated upon the failure to exercise
requisite medical skill and, being tortious in nature, general rules of negligence
usually apply in determining liability. ... The great majority of courts that have
[also] considered the question have concluded that medical malpractice actions
sound in tort and not in contract.
Id. at 637, 227 A.2d at 223.
2. W. PROSSER, TORTS 161-66, (4th ed. 1971).
3. Fink v. Steele, 166 Md. 354, 171 A. 49 (1934). In certain cases, however, the act by the
physician itself is of such an exceptional nature that it is negligent per se. An example of
such is the case where a surgeon, while operating, negligently drops his scalpel resulting
in a puncture of one of the patients organs. In such a situation, the negligence of the
physician is recognized by the court without the necessity of presenting an "expert" to
testify as to the standard of care, regardless of what the standard may be in that particular locality.
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practice actions to evaluate the requisite standard of care and skill
required of a physician practicing in a jurisdiction.4 A medical expert
must assert a familiarity with that jurisdiction's rule for judging that
standard of care before he will be permitted to offer an opinion about
the competence of a fellow practitioner. Because of the various rules or
doctrines respecting the standard of care, a practical problem of trial
preparation for the attorney may develop when a local medical expert
cannot be obtained and it thus becomes necessary to seek the assistance
of an expert from a different locality or, indeed, a different state. The
out-of-state or out-of-the-locality expert is required to show a familiarity with the rule for judging the standard of care existing in the forum
jurisdiction before he is permitted to testify as to the presence or
absence of the requisite standard of care. The more restrictive the rule
followed in a jurisdiction, the more difficult it is for the plaintiff to
prepare and produce medical testimony, notwithstanding the availability of outstanding medical specialists from out of the state.
The most restrictive of these doctrines, the traditionalstrict locality
rule, requires that the expert witness be familiar with the standard of
care possessed and exercised by physicians and surgeons in the defendant's own community or locality.' In addition, under this traditional
rule the expert witness not only must be familiar with the local
standards, but he must also practice in that locality. 6 The rationale for
this traditional rule is that a physician in a small or rural community
does not have the opportunity for continuing medical education or the
facilities and support systems used by physicians in large metropolitan
areas to more accurately diagnose and better treat his patients.7 It is
therefore argued that only physicians from the locality of the defendant-physician are competent to express an opinion as to local standards.
Such a contention is an attempt to prevent out-of-state experts from
participating in the trial and furnishing the evidence as to the alleged
lack of due care, the sine qua non of getting the case to a jury.
A significant modification to the traditional strict locality rule has
been to relax the requirement that the expert witness be from the same
locality as the defendant.8 Under this modified strict locality doctrine,
although the expert witness must still profess a familiarity with the
local standard he need not practice in that locality. The importance of
this modification is that it enables the plaintiff in a medical malpractice
action to go outside of the defendant's own locality to obtain experts
4. See, e.g., Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 102 A.2d 352 (1954) (general neighborhood
rule); Lockart v. Maclean, 77 Nev. 210, 361 P.2d 670 (1961) (traditional strict locality
rule); Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N. J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953) (no geographical limitations); Wiggins v. Piver, 276 N. C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970) (similar locality rule).
5. Lockart v. Maclean, 77 Nev. 210, 361 P.2d 670 (1961).
6. Johnson, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND. L. REV.
729, 733 (1970).
7. Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968), noted in 82 HARV. L. REV. 1781
(1969); 34 Mo. L. REV. 297 (1969); 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 328 (1968). PROSSER, supra note 2,
at 164.
8. See Teig v. St. John's Hosp., 63 Wash. 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963). See generally Johnson, supra note 6, at 733-34.
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who are willing to testify as to whether the defendant acted with the
requisite skill and care practiced by other physicians in the defendant's
own locality. In many cases it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
for a plaintiff to acquire competent local expert testimony as to the
standard of care required and the defendant-physician's negligence
because of the well known "conspiracy of silence" 9 which may exist in
the defendant's own locality.
THE MARYLAND STRICT LOCALITY RULE
A minority of jurisdictions, including Maryland,'0 still adheres to
the archaic strict locality rule. Maryland first established the general
rule regarding the degree of care and skill required to be exercised by a
physician and surgeon in the 1889 case of State ex rel. Janney v.
Housekeeper.' ' In that decision, a wrongful death action involving an
allegation of medical negligence, the Court of Appeals stated:
[T] he degree of care and skill required [of physicians] is that
reasonable degree of care and skill which physicians and surgeons ordinarily exercise in the treatment of their patients, and
that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish the want
of such skill and care in the performance of the operation and
attendance on the deceased while under treatment.' 2
Housekeeper set forth the standard to evaluate a physician's performance but the court did not include a restrictive qualification that
testimony regarding the standard of care required must be established
by experts from the same community as the defendant. It was not until
State ex rel. Solomon v. Fishel'" in 1962 that the qualification of the
strict locality rule entered the Maryland legal scene. In Fishel the
Maryland court, for the first time and without explanation, qualified
the Housekeeper standard of care by injecting a geographical limitation
which is commonly found under the strict locality rule. That standard
was the "care, skill and diligence as a physician and surgeon which is
exercised generally in the community in which he was practicing by
doctors engaged in the same field.'" ' This qualification to the House9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See pages 214-16 infra.
Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 364, 306 A.2d 568, 571 (1973).
70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382 (1889).
Id. at 172-73, 16 A. at 384.
228 Md. 189, 179 A.2d 349 (1962).
Id. at 195, 179 A.2d 353. The court cited as authority for this proposition Lane v. Calvert,
215 Md. 457, 138 A.2d 902 (1958). However, in the Lane case, the Court of Appeals did
not place such a geographical limitation on the evaluation of a defendant-physician's degree of care or skill. Rather the court merely noted that "the amount of care, skill and
diligence required is not the highest or greatest, but only such as is ordinarily exercised by
others in the profession generally." Id. at 462, 138 A.2d at 905. This failure by the Lane
court to place such a strict locality limitation upon the plaintiff in a medical malpractice
suit makes the Fishel court's addition to the Maryland medical malpractice standard,
allegedly based on Lane, of highly dubious validity. See Nolan v. Dillion, 261 Md. 516, 276
A.2d 36 (1971).
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keeper standard has become stare decisis in Maryland.
The most recent decision at the appellate level in Maryland concerning the strict locality rule is Dunham v. Elder.'S The Dunham case
arose from an allegation that a physician-defendant had been negligent
in the initial diagnosis of his affliction and in the administration of the
medication for the incorrectly diagnosed malady.' 6
At the trial the plaintiff called two out-of-state medical witnesses in
an effort to establish the standard of care required to be exercised by
the defendant. "The first of these expert witnesses, a urologist, testified
that he had never practiced, treated patients, enjoyed privileges in any
hospital or maintained offices in Maryland."' ' In response to crossexamination by the defendant's counsel the urologist testified that he
had no specific knowledge of the standard of care required of a general
practitioner in Maryland, although he professed a familiarity with the
standard throughout the United States.' " The trial court ruled that the
expert was not qualified to testify as to the standard of care required of
a general practitioner in Prince George's County, Maryland.' 9 The
plaintiff's second expert witness, an orthopedic surgeon, testified only
as to the standard of care existing in Maryland thirty-nine years before
this incident. He was never qualified as an expert witness at the trial,
and his testimony was solely that of an examining physician. 2 0
At the conclusion of the case the defendant moved for a directed
verdict asserting that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proof as
to the standard of care in "Prince George's County in 1967. ' 21 The
trial court took the Dunham case from the jury and in an oral opinion
stated:
[T] he plaintiff failed to show the standard of care of general
practitioners in Prince George's County in 1967 in this type of
case. We [sic] have ruled that they have failed to show this to
such an extent that it wasn't sufficient in order to submit that
particular aspect of it to you members of the jury. If they fail in
one of the requirements they have to fail the whole way. 2 2
On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the lower
court's ruling. In its opinion the court acknowledged that the strict
locality rule was still the controlling rule in Maryland. The court
concluded:
We read the Maryland precedents to apply the more strict rule
15. 18 Md. App. 360, 306 A.2d 568 (1973).
16. The plaintiffs affliction had initially been diagnosed as gout. It was later determined that
the plaintiff never had gout but was suffering from arthritis. The medication which had
been prescribed to combat the gout caused kidney damage. Id. at 361-62, 306 A.2d at 569.
17. Id. at 365, 306 A.2d 571.
18. Record at 84.
19. Id. at 89.
20. 18 Md. App. at 366, 306 A.2d at 572.
21. Record at 292.
22. Id. at 296.
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that the plaintiff must show that the defendant-physician failed
to exercise "the amount of care, skill and diligence as a physician and surgeon which is exercised generally in the community. . in which he was practising.... "2 3
It is apparent that Maryland still adheres to the modified strict
locality rule, and at least does not support the position of the traditional strict locality rule. Nowhere in Dunham or any of its predecessor
cases do the Maryland courts make reference to the requirement that
the expert witness be from the defendant's locality although, of course,
the expert must still be familiar with the standard of care in that
locality. Nevertheless, Maryland's position has been confused by some
lower courts to be that of a traditional strict locality state.
Recently a professor of gynecology from an outstanding, out-of-state
medical school, who, it was proffered, was totally familiar with the
standards of care in the gynecological community of Maryland by
virtue of having treated patients from Maryland, having reviewed hospital records from Maryland hospitals, and having attended meetings with
Maryland specialists, nevertheless was not permitted to testify because
he did not practice in the locality in which the alleged tort occurred. 2 4
Thus, the expertise of a witness and the equitable considerations which
must prevail in any trial were lost to the maintenance of an unfair and
unrealistic minority rule-the traditional strict locality rule. In this
episode the trial judge applied the recent Dunham decision but interpreted it as not only requiring that the expert have a knowledge of the
standards of care in the Maryland community but further requiring that
such knowledge of the standard be gained by practicing in the community about which he is testifying. 25
Dunham offers ill-defined areas for lower courts to follow and has
been interpreted in such a narrow way as to distort the true Maryland
law. In addition, a perpetuation of the strict locality rule as expressed
in the Dunham case is a puzzling matter, particularly when the court at
the same time stated that its rule is in the minority 2 6 and that if the
case were one of first impression it might be persuaded to rule otherwise. Less antiquated rules of law have been more quickly abolished
and modified than the strict locality rule. In Dunham the court stated,
in dictum:
Thus, if the issue were one of first impression in Maryland and
its resolution was necessary in order to decide this appeal, we
might be persuaded to hold that the requisite standard of
medical care and skill to which a physician should be held is the
standard which applies either in the general neighborhood of
Prince George's County or in similar localities .... [TI here was
23.
24.
25.
26.

18 Md. App. at 364, 306 A.2d at 571.
Raitt v. Montague, Law No. 37367 (Montgomery County Cir. Ct., Jan. 29, 1974).
Transcript at 85, id.
18 Md. App. at 364, 306 A.2d at 571.
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no testimony introduced by the appellants to establish what the
requisite standard of medical care and skill for a general practitioner was, either in the Prince George's County area, [or any
other locality.] 2 7
It is therefore apparent that Dunham was not the proper vehicle for
the Court of Special Appeals to abandon the outdated strict locality
rule. The court did, however, indicate that the rule should be broadened to encompass one of the two less strict doctrines, the same or
similar community rule or the general neighborhood rule.2"

STRICT LOCALITY RULE OUTDATED
Why did the Dunham court, as well as a majority of jurisdictions, feel
that the strict locality rule is outdated? The strict locality rule served an
important purpose many years ago. Before the modem developments in
rapid transportation, communication, and medical education, it was
reasonable to hold a local country doctor only to the standard of care
as practiced in his local area. Such a doctor seldom was afforded the
opportunity to visit facilities in neighboring communities; received
little, if any, professional communications to enable him to keep
up-to-date on the latest medical developments; and was educated in a
manner which did not hold to any national uniformity. Thus, the
rationale developed that a physician should only be held to his own
local standards.
Today, however, this rationale is no longer valid. The modem development of transportation, communication, and medical education all
tend to promote a degree of standardization within the medical profession. With such a standardization the need to qualify expert witnesses
based solely on geographical criteria instead of their professional skill
and knowledge is reduced, if not entirely eliminated.
Advances in medical communication have been made through the use
of "medical journals, closed circuit television presentations, special
radio networks for doctors, tape recorded digests of medical literature,
and current correspondence courses." '2 9 One trend setting method that
completely eliminates any geographical gap in the availability of the
27. Id. at 365, 306 A.2d at 571. The plaintiff never did introduce testimony establishing the
proper standard of care and consequently did not prove all the elements necessary to
establish the malpractice. The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was granted.
The court noted that the following elements were necessary to prove malpractice:
In proving a malpractice case in Maryland, a plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(1) the standard of medical skill and care ordinarily exercised in the particular locality; (2) a failure to observe that standard on the part of the physician-defendant; and
(3) a showing that the defendant's failure to observe the proper standard was a direct
cause of the injuries about which his patient complains in the malpractice action.
Id. at 363, 306 A.2d at 570.
28. Id.at363-64,306A.2dat570-71.
29. Johnson, supra note 6, at 732 (footnotes omitted).
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latest advice on diagnosis or treatment may be found in Alabama. That
state has established a 24-hour switchboard through which the calling
doctor can be connected to a staff specialist at the Medical College of
Alabama located in Birmingham." ° Now, even the general practioner
can instantly be advised by specialists utilizing the latest diagnostic
techniques and equipment. In addition, standardization of teaching in
the various medical schools,3 and the uniform requirements for certification by any of the various departments of the American Specialty
Boards,3 2 indicate the fallacy of the contention that the standard of
care in diagnosing and treating a particular illness in New York differs
from that in California.
The American Specialty Boards, which includes the fields of anesthesiology, neurological surgery, and urology 3 3 require that any specialist
seeking certification in his particular field pass certain tests and conform to certain standards. The tests are given on a nationwide basis and
do not vary from state to state. 34 These various certifying boards of
the medical specialties have existed for over fifty years.3 " Prior to 1923
the practice of medicine in the United States did not enjoy the
qualitative policing of care as it does today. Similarly, before the
creation of the various boards of the medical specialties no journals
existed dealing with common problems by which members of a specalty
could gain insight by regular and prompt receipt of such publications.
Also, the various medical education seminars and specialty meetings
which are held at the national, regional, and local levels keep the busy
practitioner aware of new trends in medical care and afford a uniformity of knowledge regardless of where in the nation the physician
practices.
There is no greater evidence of the uniformity of medical care which
prevails in the United States today than the recently enacted federal
statute 3 6 which created a Professional Standards Review Organization
(PSRO). This statute empowers the Secretary of Health, Education and
30. Id.
31. Medical Education in the United States, 210 J.A.M.A. 1445 (1969).
32. 14 MARQUIS-WHO'S WHO, INC., DIRECTORY OF MEDICAL SPECIALISTS (13th ed. 1968). The

functions and purposes of specialty boards as stated in the introduction of the DIRECTORY
OF MEDICAL SPECIALISTS are:

The primary functions of approved boards are (1) to determine the competence of
candidates who appear voluntarily for examination and to certify as diplomates those
who are qualified and (2) to improve the general standards of graduate medical education and facilities for specialty training. The objective of these activities is to promote

the public's welfare and improve medical care.
Id. at 20.

33. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 17-22. The American Board of Internal Medicine, composed of physicians from

throughout the country, conducts and approves certification of all physicians so applying.
In addition to the prerequisite that one seeking certification as an expert in a particular
field be a graduate of an approved medical school, there is the further requirement of
residency and post-graduate studies which have a national, rather than a local, application.

35. Id. at 19.
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320(c) (Supp. 1973).
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Welfare to organize regional medical districts which will implement and
oversee the quality of medical and hospital care in the particular PSRO
area involved. HEW is granting to the various medical communities
sufficient time to issue directives to the medical profession so that
various physicians and specialists adhere to standards which are uniform. It is interesting to note that the implication of this regulation of
HEW is that the medical profession is being given until January 1, 1976,
to establish its peer review boards whose review would be based on
uniform standards-the alternative being that the federal government
would implement such controls itself.

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF STRICT LOCALITY
One of the major obstacles which must be overcome by a plaintiff in
a jurisdiction which still employs the strict locality rule is the problem
of obtaining local practitioners to testify against a local colleague. That
this is a very real and practical problem is evidenced by a recent study
conducted by a special committee formed by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare to investigate the total impact of malpractice
generally on the medical, legal, and lay community. 3" This study,
beginning in September, 1971, and lasting sixteen months, involved a
nationwide survey of physicians. The study culminated in a report that
emphasized the antagonism which local physicians have toward malpractice suits being filed in their community. The commission cited a
number of reasons why physicians might be reluctant to testify in
malpractice cases:
1. The reluctance to suffer loss of time and income from
practice that may be involved in court appearance;
2. The inability to provide care to patients while away in court;
3. The fear and resentment of physicians regarding crossexamination under the adversary legal system;
4. The natural reluctance to injure friends and fellow craftsmen, coupled with the feeling that "there but for the grace of
God go I"; and
5. The common belief that most malpractice claims are without
sound basis.3 '
37. HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973).
38. Id. at 36-37. Illustrative of the uniformity of the medical profession's opposition and
hostility to participate as an expert witness in a lawsuit against a fellow physician of their
locality is the recent case of Capobianco v. Gordon, 19 Md. App. 662, 313 A.2d 517
(1974). This case demonstrates the readiness of the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty, ostensibly a quasi governmental bureau of the Medical Examiner's office, see MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 130 (1970), writing through their counsel to a physician defendant and offering gratuitously by virtue of the defendant-physician's membership in the medical society a "panel of experts" to help in the defense of the case.
November 3, 1972
Dear Dr. Gordon:
I confirm the referral by Med-Chi to this office of your defense pursuant to its
By Laws.
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Based on the survey, the commission recommended that "organized
medicine and osteopathy establish an official policy encouraging members of their professions to cooperate fully in medical malpractice
actions so that justice will be assured for all parties; and, the Commission encourages the establishment of pools from which expert witnesses
can be drawn." 3
Within the boundaries of the modified strict locality rule as enunciated in Dunham, this writer has been able to establish the requisite
foundation and to qualify out-of-state medical experts by eliciting the
following statements in testimony:
1. That the particular medical expert is qualified in his field by
receiving his medical degree at a recognized and approved medical school.
2. That following his graduation he pursued residency in a
particular specialty of medicine.
3. That following his residency he actively engaged in the
practice of that specialty.
4. That in a particular year he applied for, was tested, and
certified as a specialist by his particular specialty board.
5. That since his certification he has received various medical
journals dealing with the practice of medicine throughout the
country including Maryland.
6. That he has had contact at medical meetings with Maryland
physicians where ideas were exchanged, as were case histories
involving the treatment of particular ailments.
7. That he has in the past read papers by medical specialists
from Maryland dealing with the practice of medicine here and
the management of a particular medical problem.
8. That he has treated patients who formerly were treated in
Maryland, thus necessitating the obtention of medical charts
and hospital charts from Maryland which revealed how the
patient's medical problem was handled in Maryland.
9. That he has in the past had professional contact with Maryland physicians regarding the treatment of a patient who has
since moved out of Maryland.
10. That as a result of all of the above, he is familiar with the
standard of care in the community and finds no difference
between that standard and the standard of his own state.
I should appreciate your insurance carrier and its counsel advising me of such
time, if any, as it would consider a panel of doctors to be of assistance in this matter.
In the meantime, you are cautioned to restrict communication on this subject
to authorized representatives of your carrier, its counsel and this office.
Very truly yours,
/s/ John F. King
John F. King
Id. at 664, 313 A.2d at 518.
Such panels are not available to plaintiffs. The individual participation on behalf of a
plaintiff of a local practitioner who is a member of the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty can
readily be appreciated as an act which would engender the displeasure of his peers.
39. Id. at 37.
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A second obstacle created by the adherence to the strict locality rule
concerns the fear that a small group of physicians can, by their
carelessness, establish an inferior local standard of care. As an example
of the application of the locality rule, a renowned professor from an
outstanding medical school, who also practices within a large city
community, would be effectively prevented from commenting upon a
departure from the standard of medical care in a local community
merely because he is not familiar with the standard of care established
in that local community. 4 0 This could be so even if such violation were
a basic omission of minimal standards of care. Thus, the disturbing
practical effect of the continuing adherence to the strict locality rule
results in giving more consideration to artificial geographical boundaries
and less to the expertise and qualifications of the expert sought to be
introduced.

SOLUTIONS TO THE STRICT LOCALITY RULE PROBLEMS
Due to these problems created by following a strict locality rule and
the antiquated reasons given for its support, most jurisdictions have
abandoned it in favor of the two more liberal rules: the similar locality 4 1 rule, and the general neighborhood rule.4 2
The similar locality rule requires that the defendant be held to the
standard of care ordinarily exercised by medical professionals either in
The expert
the defendant's own locality or in a similar locality .4
witness does not have to profess a familiarity with the practices in the
defendant's specific locality, as is required by the modified strict
locality rule, if he expresses a familiarity with the practices in a locality
considered to be similar to that of the defendant.
The obvious drawback to this approach is the problem still present
for the court in determining not the competency of the expert witness
but rather the definition of a "similar" locality. However, this seems to
be less of a difficulty than the problem of determining the familiarity
of the nonlocal experts with the local standards as presented under the
strict locality rule.
The general neighborhood rule requires the defendant to conform to
the standards in the general neighborhood of his locality, 4 4 the expert
witness need only be familiar with that standard. The general neighbor40. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
41. See Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 363-64, 306 A.2d 568, 570-71 (1973); Wiggins v.
Piver, 276 N.C. 134, 178 S.E.2d 393 (1970).
42. See Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 102 A.2d 352 (1954); Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md.
App. 360, 363-64, 306 A.2d 568, 570-71 (1973).
43. 18 Md. App. at 363-64, 306 A.2d at 570-71; DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d
333 (1961); Smith v. Yohe, 412 Pa. 94, 194 A.2d 167 (1963); Henley v. Mason, 154 Va. 381,
153 S.E. 653 (1930).
44. 18 Md. App. at 364, 306 A.2d at 571. See, e.g., Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 102
A.2d 352 (1954).
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hood has been defined by one court to encompass that "area coextensive with the medical and professional means available in those
centers that are readily accessible for appropriate treatment of the
patient."
The general neighborhood rule readily satisfies one important criteria
set by the proponents of the strict locality rule-accessibility. Those
proponents argue that the local doctor should be held only to a
standard of care that is practiced in areas which are accessible to him.
In effect, the more enlightened jurisdictions have simply considered this
argument in light of recent advances in communications and transportation and have considered that the accessibility concept has been broadened. A local doctor can now easily travel to areas surrounding him and
obtain advice and education from doctors of similar specialties. There is
no reason why the local doctor today should not be held to the
standards exercised by doctors in surrounding neighborhoods in addition to his own locality.
This rule's most potent attack on the difficulties created by the strict
locality rule is that it lessens the chance of a lower standard being
applied simply because a few doctors in a small area may be less than
competent.
The importance of the similar locality approach, as well as the
general neighborhood approach, is that the practical problems created
by the strict locality rule are eliminated. This is due to the availability
of nonlocal experts and the abandonment of isolated standards as the
only criteria for judging medical negligence. These rules are more in
accordance with the modern developments that have rendered the strict
locality rule obsolete. The reasoning behind extending the geographical
boundary was aptly noted by the Supreme Court of North Dakota in
Tvedt v. Haugen.4 6 That court recognized:
Today, with the rapid methods of transportation and easy
means of communication, the horizons have been widened, and
the duty of a doctor is not fulfilled merely by utilizing the
means at hand in the particular village where he is practicing. So
far as medical treatment is concerned, the borders of the locality and community have, in effect, been extended so as to
include those centers readily accessible where appropriate treatment may be had which the local physician, because of limited
facilities or training, is unable to give.4
'

Maryland is in the minority by perpetuating a form of the strict
locality rule. The need for a change in this rule is evidenced by the
abandonment of the strict locality rule in all of the states adjoining
Maryland. The enlightened similar locality approach has been followed
45. Pederson v.Dunmouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73. 79, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967).

46. 70 N. D. 338, 294 N.W. 183(1940).
47. Id. at 349, 294 N.W. at 188.
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4

in West Virginia, 8 Delaware, 9 Pennsylvania" 0 and Virginia' ' in place
of the more archaic strict locality rule. A slightly more remote state,
Connecticut, has ventured a step beyond the similar locality rule and
based its standard on the general neighborhood rule. In Ardoline v.
Keegan' 2 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut noted:
To recover in a malpractice action against a physician the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant failed to exercise that
degree of care, skill or diligence ordinarily had and exercised by
physicians engaged in the same line of practice in the general
neighborhood where the treatment complained of was administered.' '
New Jersey adheres to a very liberal interpretation of the locality rule
and has abandoned geographical limitations altogether. In Carbone v.
Warburton 4 the Supreme Court of New Jersey chose to base a witness'
expertise upon ones "knowledge and experience in the same profession
to know and state whether in the given circumstances of a particular
case the physician or surgeon had failed to exercise that degree of
knowledge and skill which usually pertains to other members of the
profession."' '
The court reasoned that a witness' qualification to
testify hinges upon his "knowledge and experience in the care and
treatment of the illness or injury." ' 6

CONCLUSION
Maryland is alone among the mid-Atlantic states in upholding what
the surrounding jurisdictions have recognized as an outdated rule. Of
some hope to a plaintiff in Maryland is the inference that can be drawn
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

White v. Moore, 139W. Va. 806, 62 S.E.2d 122(1950).
DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
Smith v. Yohe, 412 Pa. 94, 194 A.2d 167 (1963).
Henley v. Mason, 154 Va. 381, 153 S.E. 653 (1930).
140 Conn. 552, 102 A.2d 352 (1963).
Id. at 556, 102 A.2d at 355 (emphasis added).
11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953).
Id. at 424, 94 A.2d at 683. This logic has been applied in jurisdictions throughout the
nation. See, e.g., McElroy v. Frost, 268 P.2d 273 (Okla. 1954) wherein the plaintiff brought
suit alleging that the defendant doctor, while treating the plaintiff for a skin disorder,
negligently administered x-ray treatments resulting in severe burns "about the groin,
scrotum and genitals" which "rendered the plaintiff impotent and sterile" and further
caused "radiodermatitis, constant pain and discomfort and potential cancer." The plaintiff's experts, although not from the same community as the defendant, were allowed to
testify at trial. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed that decision noting:
It is true the witnesses were not from the same community but, with one exception, the medical evidence in plaintiffs behalf came from specialists in their particular field. It is a matter of common understanding that a proper method of treating human ailments by X-ray would not vary from place to place or state to state.
What is the best practice in one place likewise would be the best in another.
Id. at 279-80.
56. 11 N. J. at 425, 94 A.2d at 683.
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from the dicta in Dunham which indicates that this jurisdiction may
soon abandon the strict locality rule.
The time has long since passed for the Maryland courts to abandon
the strict locality rule and recognize the reality of the more liberal
approaches applied in the majority of jurisdictions. If Maryland continues to persist in adhering to stare decisis in regards to the archaic
requirements necessary to establish a standard of care in a medical
malpractice suit, then the legislature should take it upon itself to reduce
the onerous burden upon the injured party.
The need for change in this area is amplified in an article entitled
An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of Care." The
author there notes:
The courts that are deemphasizing or abolishing the locality
rules are moving away from a reliance upon geographic location
and toward an emphasis on the doctor's opportunities for
acquiring information concerning current medical practice and
procedure. Whether verbalized as a national standard or not, the
effect is to move toward a more standardized practice throughout the country.' 8
The strict locality rule exists today solely for the benefit of the
defense. It prevents the testimony of otherwise competent, experienced
specialists whose only disqualification is that they do not practice in
the community involved. Since the rule no longer has any justification,
the Maryland courts should abandon it as a requirement governing the
admissibility of a proposed expert witness' testimony.
57. Johnson, supra, note 6.
58. Id. at 741 (footnotes omitted).

